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Recipe for Victory
The Fight for Hill 677 During the
Battle of the Kap'yong River,
24-25 April 1951
Brent Watson
uring the night of 24-25 April 1951, the
Second Battalion, Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry fought what became the
most famous Canadian battle of the Korean War.
Outnumbered and isolated, the Princess Pats
repulsed wave after wave of attacking Chinese
infantry from their positions atop Hill 677
overlooking the Kap'yong River Valley. Although
a comparatively minor episode in the broader
context of the Korean War, Canadian retention of
Hil1677 made an important contribution to the
Commonwealth victory at Kap'yong. More
significantly, the fight for Hill677 was clearly the
most successful set-piece engagement fought by
the Canadians in Korea. 1 In recognition of their
achievement, the Princess Pats were awarded the
United States Presidential Unit Citation- the only
Canadian unit ever to earn this distinction.

D

Although clearly an important event for the
Canadians, the fight for Hill677 has received little
scholarly attention in Canada. 2 Commonwealth
historians, in contrast, have been busy.
Examining the action from the perspective of the
New Zealand gunners who supported the
Canadians, Ian MacGibbon suggested that
artillery fire was the key to victory, and saved the
beleaguered Patricias from certain defeat.~
Although supporting fire, including that from the
Canadians themselves, was the single most
important factor in the successful defence of Hill
677, it was by no means the only one. An
operational analysis of the battle reveals that the
Second World War experiences of the Patricias'
senior officers, the specialized nature of the
battalion's pre-battle training program, high
morale, and the failure of the enemy to co-

ordinate and press his attack also helped to make
the Canadian stand possible.

*****
anada played a leading role in the creation
of the United Nations in June 1945. Only five
years later Canadians learned that membership
in the international organization did not come
without a price. When the Security Council
passed a resolution requesting member states
to provide military forces for the defence of South
Korea, the Canadian government responded in
the affirmative.

C

Though the politicians were ready to go to
war in Korea, the Canadian Army was not. Postwar defence cuts had reduced the infantry
component of the Army Active Force to only three
under strength battalions. Tasked with the
defence of the entire Canadian land mass, this
skeleton of an army could spare precious few of
its soldiers to meet Canada's Korean
commitment. Caught on the horns of an
increasingly embarrassing dilemma, the
government decided to quickly recruit, from the
streets, an all-volunteer special force "for use in
carrying out Canada's obligations under the
United Nations Charter.'4
The formation of the Canadian Army Special
Force (subsequently renamed the 25th Canadian
Infantry Brigade Group) was authorized on 7
August 1950. The following day a full-page
recruiting ad in the nation's major newspapers
announced: "The Canadian Army Wants Men
Now ... to meet aggression in accordance with the
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Lieutenant-Colonel J.R.
Stone. commanding olficer
qf the 2nd Battalion.
Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light lf1fantry.
Stone had a distinguished
record in the Second World
War rising .from the rank Q[
private to commanding
officer Q[ the Loyal
Edmonton Regiment in
1944. His skill as a
commander continued in
Korea

United Nations Charter." Preference would be
given to veterans of the Second World War, and
the term of enlistment was for eighteen months.
The core of the 25th Brigade would consist of
second battalions of the three Active Force
infantry regiments- the Royal22e Regiment, the
Royal Canadian Regiment, and the Princess
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2 PPCLI).
Mobilizing second battalions of these
renowned regiments served a dual purpose. First,
the units of the 25th Brigade could "latch on to
their parent formations thereby expediting
training and organization." 5 Second, the Active
Force units would quickly instill the requisite
regimental ethos in their respective second
additions- an important consideration, given the
fact that it can take a newly formed unit years to
develop the esprit de corps necessary for the
maintenance of high morale under adverse
battlefield conditions. Initial strength of the 25th
Brigade was set at 4960 all ranks, plus a
reinforcement pool of 2105. 6 Despite initial
concerns that the high level of employment would
lead to a shortage of recruits, "there was no
difficulty at all" in finding men to fill the ranks of
the 25th Brigade. 7
Thus 2 PPCLI came into being. In the days
following the Canadian government's call to arms,
a cadre from the lst Battalion, Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry ( 1 PPCLI) commenced
drafting and setting up a training program for
the 2nd Battalion at the Currie Barracks,

southwest of Calgary, Alberta. As the enlisted men
of 2 PPCLI completed basic military training,
their officers, all of whom were either veterans
of the Second World War or serving members of
the Canadian Army, were undergoing a refresher
course at Calgary. 8 Command of the battalion was
given to Lieutenant-Colonel James R. Stone,
DSO, MC, one of the most capable fighting
soldiers in Canadian military history. Born in
England in 1909, Stone immigrated to Canada
at the age of 18. Most of his pre-military life was
spent in Alberta's Peace River country where he
worked as a farmer and forest ranger. With the
outbreak of the Second World War, Stone enlisted
as a private in the Loyal Edmonton Regiment;
by 1944, then a Lieutenant-Colonel, he was in
command of the unit.
As a junior infantry officer in the Sicilian
campaign, Stone participated in the bloody
fighting down the Agira and Simeto valleys. It was
here that he learned the tactics of hilltop defence
from the masters themselves, the German Army.
More importantly, perhaps, Stone's combat
e:x.lJeriences in Sicily and, later, Italy, imbued him
with an eye for vital ground- a tactical skill that
is essential to the successful planning and
conduct of operations in mountainous terrain. 9
Stone's ability to identify vital ground would
figure prominently in the Patricias' successful
stand at Kap'yong.
By the beginning of October, 1383 other
ranks were undergoing training with 2 PPCLI. 10

8
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While most of the battalion was made up of men
who specifically enlisted for service in Korea, the
majority of warrant officers and sergeants were
from 1 PPCLI. Nearly 75 percent of the enlisted
men had some prior military experience.
Approximately half of this figure had served with
the Canadian Army in the Second World War;
the other half had either cadet or militia
experience. 11 The average age of the Second World
War veterans was 26, while that for the rest of
the battalion's enlisted men was 20. 12
For the next month training was carried out
on a seven day, three night per week basis.
However, as the Patricias prepared for battle it
appeared as if they might not be needed in Korea
afterall. On 15 September 1950, after two months
of bitter fighting along the Pusan perimeter,
United Nations forces under the command of
General Douglas MacArthur captured the
strategic port city of Inchon and began a rapid
advance up the Korean peninsula. With the North
Korean People's Army on the brink of defeat,
there was talk that the war would be over by
Christmas. Consequently, the Canadian
government reduced its planned contribution of
a brigade group, and decided to send only one
battalion of infantry to "show the nag" and assist
with any UN occupation duties. 13 The battalion
was 2 PPCLI. 14

When the Patricias boarded their troop
transport for Korea in late November, they had
yet to undergo collective infantry training. 15 In
other words, 2 PPCLI was untrained as a fighting
unit. In fact. at the time of embarkation the rille
companies - Able, Baker, Charlie, and Dog
companies~ had not even started their respective
collective training programs. Initially, few were
troubled by 2 PPCLI's training deficiencies; there
would be time to complete collective training once
the battalion arrived in Korea. However, as the
Canadians crossed the international date line,
the war in Korea was changing for the worse. On
24 November, MacArthur launched a general
offensive across the UN front. As his troops
moved northward, they encountered stiff
resistance from Chinese Communist Forces
(CCF) who had crossed into Korea in midOctober. Although they had appeared on the
battlefield in considerable numbers shortly after
this, the UN Command was slow to recognize
Chinese involvement. 16
This time, however, it was different. On 26
November, the Chinese launched a massive
counter-offensive in the West, followed two days
later by an equally large attack in the East.
Division after division of UN and Republic of
Korea (ROK) forces was either destroyed or
forced to make a hasty retreat in the face of the

Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
exercising aboard the USNS Joe P. Martinez en route to Korea, November 1950.
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Troops qf "B" Company, 2 PPCLI crossing a log bridge, February 1951.

advancing CCF juggernaut. Suddenly, the
occupation duties assigned to the half-trained
Patricias ceased to exist. The battalion would see
combat, after all.

in the area." 19 Despite Stone's caveats, the 8th
Army G-3 (operations) officer refused to grant 2
PPCLI the eight weeks' training time Stone
considered necessary.

Within this context, 2 PPCLI's training
deficiencies assumed a new significance.
However, as much as the officers fretted over the
future operational employment of the battalion,
little could be done to rectify the situation until
the unit reached Korea.

Stone, however, still had an ace up his sleeve.
Before 2 PPCLI left for Korea, the Canadian
government had issued him with command
instructions designed to eschew potential
American intransigence. Incensed by the G-3
officer's unwillingness to appreciate his position,
Stone flew to Seoul to confront LieutenantGeneral (Bulldog) Walker, commander of the 8th

On 18 December the Patricias' troop ship
docked at Pusan Harbour, and the 918 men of
the battalion proceeded, by US Army transport,
to their staging camp on Yang-Do Island.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stone, meanwhile, reported
to 8th Army headquarters where he received
instructions to move his battalion to a "training
area" at Suwon, only 50 miles south of the fluid
battleline. 17 From Suwon, the Patricias would
move forward and join the 29th British Infantry
Brigade (29th BIB), which was occupying a
reserve position behind the Imjin River defences
north ofSeoul. 1 ~ Apparently, the Americans were
attempting to use 2 PPCLI as part of the 8th
Army's reserve, before it completed collective
training. Stone "queried the advisability" of
moving within earshot "of an unstable front with
green troops, particularly as the general idea was
for [the Patricias] to patrol against guerilla forces

Army.

Judging from his dealings with the G-3
officer, Stone expected his meeting with Walker
to be somewhat less than congenial. To Stone's
surprise, Bulldog Walker "was very gracious," and
listened sympathetically as the Canadian outlined
the state of 2 PPCLI's training. 20 Walker, however,
refused to grant Stone his eight weeks' training,
correctly arguing that 2 PPCLI was as well trained
as the American units currently holding the line
against the Chinese advance. It soon became clear
to Stone that Walker and his staff were unaware
of his command instructions. 21 When Stone
produced a copy of his orders, Walker was
disappointed that the unit was not ready for
immediate operational employment. and agreed
to give them eight weeks to prepare for battle. ~
2
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Soldiers from 2 PPCLI fire their mortar during training at Miryang, Korea, February 1951.

While Stone was in Seoul, the men of2 PPCLI
were busy drawing winter kit and uncrating their
equipment. At this time, 2 PPCLI, now on US
Army scale, was issued with its new Americanpattern support weapons and vehicles. Prior to
Korea, the Canadian infantry had been outfitted
almost exclusively with equipment of British
design or manufacture. However, as the 25th
Brigade prepared for battle it became obvious
that some of the infantry's British-pattern
equipment would have to be replaced
immediately, lest the brigade's operational
capabilities be compromised. Situation reports
from the 27th British Commonwealth Infantry
Brigade (27th BCIB), the first Commonwealth
formation to see action in Korea, regularly
described engagements during which enemy
mortars outranged the 27th Brigade's 3-inch
mortars by as much as 2,000 yards. 2 :1 In view of
the 27th BCIB's operational experience, the
Department of National Defence decided to
replace most of the Canadian infantry's Britishpattern support weapons with the very latest in
American military hardware. Thus, with the
exception of the venerable Vickers Medium
Machine-Gun (MMG), for which the Americans
possessed no superior alternative, all of the
infantry support weapons to see service with the
Canadians in Korea were of American origin.
The most significant of these new American arms
and equipment were the 81 mm and 60 mm

2

mortars, and the M3A1 half-track. '~ The 81 mm
mortar was a battalion support weapon; its
primary purpose was to kill enemy personnel. 25
Due to their substantial weight (107 pounds each,
not including ammunition), 2 PPCLI's six 81 mm
mortars were mounted for travelling on twelve
M3A1 half-tracks. Each half-track mounted one
.50 and one .30 calibre Browning machine-gun
which could be dismounted to provide protection
for the mortar and its crew during a fire task.
The 60 mm mortar was essentially a smaller
version of the 81 mm mortar. "An integral weapon
invariably going into position with the riOe
company," the 60 mm mortar provided the
company commander with immediate indirect
fire support. 26 The weapon could fire a high
explosive bomb to a maximum range of 1939
yards 27 - nearly five times further than the
weapon it supplanted in Canadian service. The
60 mm mortar's maximum range would be used
with devastating effect on Hill677.
By the beginning of January, the Patricia rifle
companies were finally able to begin collective
training. In the words of the 1950 Canadian Army
Manual of Training, Trainingjor War, "collective
training means exercises and manoeuvres, the
keynote to both being realism." 28 Accordingly, the
immediate objective of the Patricias' collective
program was to inure the men against the
ll
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physical hardships of the Korean battlefield.
Reports from the front continually emphasized
the need for troops to "be conditioned for hill
climbing, man pack carrying, and living under
adverse climatic conditions. "29 To this end, the
Patricias moved to a training camp astride the
Miryang River, fifty miles north of Pusan. In the
rugged mountains above Miryang, the soldiers
of 2 PPCLI received their first real taste of the
difficult, and at times unforgiving, Korean
battlescape.
In addition to raising the level of physical
fitness in the battalion, the hill climbing and cross
country movement exercises above Miryang
taught the men the tactical necessity of
dominating the high ground overlooking the
valley floors. Moreover, these exercises
incorporated the tactical lessons learned by the
29th BIB during the previous month's fighting.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stone had first met Brigadier
Brodie, commander of the 29th BIB, during his
December visit to 8th Army headquarters in
Seoul. Brodie and Stone discussed in detail the
action fought by the Northumberland Fusiliers
at Sibyon-Ni. Just before dawn on 30 November,
the Chinese had attacked the Northumberlands,
who were dug in, on the high ground, in mutually
supporting company "islands" of defence. The
Northumberlands had been forced to deploy in
this manner because the mountainous terrain
precluded a tight battalion position. In the
ensuing battle, they beat back the numerically
superior Chinese force with the loss of only 14
British casualties.3° Commenting on his meeting
with Brigadier Brodie, Stone wrote:
It seems apparent that resolute men, dug in, in
proper islands of defence can kill at will, the
hordes that rush the positions ... .Infiltration
between [company islands] must be expected,
but with all areas defended such infiltration is
not serious. The Chinese ... rely on massed
movement of infantry ... to overrun opposition.
Such should be a defender's paradise provided
troops are all trained marksmen and realize that
if they run, they will certainly die .... It is my
intention to commence [collective] training with
particular emphasis on defence .... 'J 1

For the next six weeks, the Patricia rifle
companies scrambled to master the tactics of
mountain fighting in Korea. A typical training
exercise during this period saw the rifle
companies advance into the mountains in the
morning, and occupy hilltop defensive positions

for the night. During these exercises the "enemy"
(Sniper and Intelligence sections) made extensive
use ofTNTcharges, live tracer rounds, and paraflares in an attempt to familiarize the defending
riflemen with the audio and visual characteristics
of the battlefield. Following the detonation of
randomly placed TNT charges, the Sniper and
Intelligence sections directed live fire on to a
feature immediately next to the company areas.
After several minutes of firing, live rounds were
exchanged for blanks, and the "enemy" launched
harassing and probing attacks against the
company positions. As it turned out, the Sniper
and Intelligence sections were seldom able to
infiltrate the company areas in strength. In an
interview with a Canadian war correspondent the
morning after the successful "defence" of his
company's position, a Dog company soldier
boldly commented, "If the nights area as black
as that one, I defy any Chinese to get me out of
my hole. You'd just sit tight and knock them out
as they go by."32
Recalling that the "enemy" during these sham
battles were, alas, armed only with blanks, and
that the erstwhile opposing forces often
conducted joint debriefings over quart-sized
bottles of beer, the Dog company soldier's
buoyant optimism is not surprising.
Nevertheless, the importance of the training
exercises in the mountains above Miryang should
not be discounted. For it was during these
exercises that the soldiers of 2 PPCLI mastered
the tactics that were to figure so prominently in
their successful stand at Kap'yong.
Ironically, after devoting a disproportionate
amount of training time to the tactics of hilltop
defence, it was the tactical offence that dominated
the Canadians' first encounters with the enemy.
On 17 February the Patricias, having completed
their collective training, came under the
operational command of the 27th BCIB. When 2
PPCLijoined the 27th Brigade it consisted of two
British battalions- the lst Battalion, Middlesex
Regiment, and the lst Battalion, Argyle and
Sutherland Highlanders- and the 3rd Battalion,
Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR). 33 The 16th
New Zealand Field Regiment ( 16 NZFR) and the
60th Indian (Parachute) Field Ambulance
provided artillery and medical support.
The next two months saw the 27th Brigade
inch its way slowly northward as part of the 9th
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Right: Two soldiers from 2 PPCLI survey the terrain,
17 Aprill951.
Below: A sectionfrom 2 PPCLI leaves a regrouping
point,[or an enemy-held position, 24 February
1951. The mountainous nature of Korea is
evident in this photo.

US Corps' advance to the 38th parallel. During
this period the Patricias launched a series of
company-sized attacks against Chinese rear
guard positions with decidedly mixed results.
After an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge expertly
camouflaged Chinese troops from their positions
atop Hill 532, Dog company suffered 34
casualties in only nine hours offighting.:34
When not dodging Chinese bullets, or, in one
instance, a misdirected napalm strike,:35 the men
of 2 PPCLI had to contend with blizzards, icecovered hillsides, perpetually wet clothing,
monotonous food, unpotable water (and the
diarrhea that often accompanies it), blisters,
biting pack straps, and the innumerable other
discomforts that comprise the infantryman's lot.
But no matter how arduous their stint at the front
became. they could take solace in knowing that
their regular rotation out of the line would be :;;;
""'
punctuated by hot meals, warm baths, and cold ~
beer. lt was during one of these respites from the ~
fighting that 2 PPCLI received orders to establish '-!
defensive positions astride the Kap'yong River.
~

*****
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uring the 8th Army's general advance to the
38th parallel evidence accrued "of a
formidable enemy build-up" opposite the 1st and
9th US Corps' fronts. 36 By 20 April it was
apparent that the enemy was preparing for a
renewed offensive, as fresh formations from the
2nd and 3rd CCF Field Armies occupied the line
facing UN forces. Just before midnight on 22
April, the Chinese launched a full-scale offensive
across the width of the UN front. In the 9th Corps
sector, the weight of the attack fell on the 6th
ROK Division. Unable to hold the line against
the advancing Chinese juggernaut and in danger
of being cut off, the South Koreans fell back
through the Kap'yong River valley.

D

In the early morning of 23 April, the 27th
BCIB was ordered to take up blocking positions
above the Kap'yong. :17 The 2 PPCLI were to occupy
defensive positions in the vicinity of Hill 677
(referred to simply as "Six-Seven-Seven"),
covering the approacl;les from the north and
north east of the heightY 8
At 0800 hours on 23 April, LieutenantColonel Stone and the battalion Intelligence
Officer (10) left for 27th Brigade headquarters
for a preliminary Orders ("0") Group. On their
return, a battalion "0" group was held, and the
CO, IO. company commanders, MMG officer,
Mortar officer, Signals Officer and Artillery Officer
departed for a reconnaissance ofHill677.:m After
starting out in the wrong direction, the Patricia
reconnaissance group reached the northern
approaches to Hill677, where they were afforded
a clear view of the position the battalion was to
occupy across the valley. Stone recalled:
.... we wenl to the enemy side of the hill and
looked at the hill from the enemy's point of view.
I kept thinking that if I was the one trying to
take the hill, I would move in such and such
direction, and so on .... ! then decided which way
the attack would come and deployed the
battalion accordingly. 40

Following another "0" Group, the company
commanders proceeded to reconnoitre the areas
assigned to them. At the same time, the IO
conducted a reconnaissance of the approaches
leading to the battalion position from the southeast ofHill677. The IO discovered a tactical road,
constructed by the Americans, which led to the
position chosen for Battalion Tactical
Headquarters (Bn Tac HQ). From Tac HQ, trails

following the ridge lines of Hill 677 led to the
company areas. 41
At 1800 hours Stone called a final "0" Group,
and the battalion was ordered to prepare for the
move to Hill 677. The rifle companies went
forward in vehicles to the village ofTungmudae,
approximately one mile south of Hill 677. The
move to Tungmudae was completed without
incident, although the sight of panic-stricken
ROK soldiers fleeing past the Patricia column did
not inspire confidence. A soldier in Able company
recollected:
There was just a stream of Koreans heading
south and we were heading north .... These guys
were coming out as if they were piling out of a
bank building .... I've never seen fear and
disorganization like those guys going down the
road. It was on for hours and it wasn't all that
encouraging. 42

From Tungmudae, the rifle companies moved to
their positions on foot. With each man packing
his personal weapon, several hundred rounds of
ammunition, grenades, an entrenching tool, a full
water bottle, and a 24 hour field ration pack- in
addition to his personal kit- the soldiers in the
Patricia rifle companies reached their positions
utterly exhausted. To make matters worse, many
in the battalion were nursing wicked hangovers,
as the evening of 22 April had been spent
clustered around bon fires imbibing bottles of
Labatt's lager. 4 : 1 Nevertheless, by 2200 hours the
rifle companies were digging in on the north face
ofHill677.
On Hill677, the Patricia rifle companies were
deployed as follows: Able company on the right
flank, covering the approaches leading north and
east from the battalion position; Charlie company
along the ridge line of Hill 677, in the centre of
the battalion area; Dog company on the left flank,
covering the approaches leading west from the
battalion position; and Baker company on the
ridge line to the north of Dog company, covering
the approaches immediately north of the
battalion position. Able, Baker, and Dog
companies were allotted one section of MMGs
each, at two Vickers guns per section.
Nearly a mile and a half wide, gullied and
wooded, Hill 677 was practically "impossible to
defend in the classic manner of deploying
companies to support each other. '" ~
1
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Small Korean village at the eastern base of Hill 677.

Consequently, each rifle company was
responsible for its own defended locality, with
platoons deployed to be mutually supporting.
Gaps between the "company islands" were
covered by defensive fire (OF) tasks of the MMG
sections, the battalion mortars, and the field guns
of supporting artillery units which included not
only the 16 NZFR, but also several American 9th
Corps artillery formations. 45 Owing to the
steepness of the terrain, it was extremely difficult
to co-ordinate all of the Patricias' supporting
weapons into a coherent battalion fire plan. 46 The
gradient of Hill 677 is so steep in some places
that one must crawl on hands and knees, as this
author discovered firsthand during a recent
research sojoum to the battle site. This steepness
restricted MMG, mortar and artillery OF tasks
to the main ridge line approaches to the
Canadians' positions. Approaches leading to the
company and platoon positions between the main
ridge lines had to be covered by small arms fire
and hand grenades.

By 0300 hours on 24 April, Mortar platoon
was base-plated and ready for action; an hour
later Bn Tac HQ was operational. 48 Thanks to
the Pioneer platoon and a Patricia motor
mechanic, all of the Mortar platoon's half-tracks
completed the move to the base plate position,
bringing 2100 rounds of mortar ammunition
forward at one time. 49 Now in position, the
Patricias prepared their defences. The twentyfour .30 and .50 calibre Browning machine guns
carried on the Mortar platoon's twelve half-tracks
were dismounted and deployed to cover the
approaches leading into the rear of the Bn Tac
HQ area and battalion positions from the village
ofTugmudae. As a further precaution, all Support
company personnel were assigned defensive
positions and a "girdle ofNo.36 grenades set with
tripwires" was laid along the Bn Tac HQ
perimeter. 50

Meanwhile, Bn Tac HQ, the Mortar platoon
and the Pioneer platoon, proceeded via the
tactical road to their positions on the rear slope
of Hill 677 overlooking the village of
Tungmudae. 47 The move began at 2130 hours,
but was delayed due to the inability of the Mortar
platoon's half-tracks to negotiate the narrow
corners of the tactical road. The Pioneer platoon
widened the track with a series of well-placed
808 plastic explosive charges, but the move was

For the rest of the night, the men of 2 PPCLI
scrambled to prepare for the expected Chinese
onslaught. Defensive positions were hurriedly
constructed, trip flares were strung, weapons and
equipment were checked, communications wire
was laid and OF tasks were arranged and
registered. Meanwhile, 3 RAR took up defensive
positions across the Kap'yong River valley on Hill
504, on the right of the 27th Brigade front. By
2200 hours on 23 April, the Australians were

further delayed when one of the half-tracks
experienced a mechanical break down.
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being heavily engaged by the leading elements of
the 118th CCF Division. 51 Wave after wave of CCF
grenadiers and "burp-gunners" supported by
mortar fire, rushed the Australian positions.
From their higher vantage point across the valley,
the Patricias could only watch and wait. For some,
this was the most trying time of the impending
battle. Mouths became dry with anticipation,
hearts began to beat wildly, and more than a few
men were gripped by a sudden urge to urinate. 5 2
According to Lieutenant Brian Munro, an Able
company platoon commander, "Panic spread like
an electrical current, bouncing from slit trench
to slit trench. The men began to change positions
amongst themselves, wanting to fight and die with
a buddy. "5 :1 However, a series of expletive-laced
shouts of encouragement from Sergeant Tommy
Prince 54 and the other company NCOs, gradually
helped the men to regain their composure. 55
By 0200 hours on 24 April, the lateral
communication line between 2 PPCLI and 3 RAR
was cut. Henceforth only wireless communication
between the Australians and Canadians was
possible. At one point, the Chinese severed the
direct communications link between 3 RAR and
27th Brigade HQ, and messages had to be relayed
through 2 PPCLI via the battalions' wireless
sets. 56
Fearing that his right flank would be left open
to attack if the Australians failed to hold their
positions on Hill 504, Stone redeployed Baker
company. He ordered Major Vince Lilley and his
men to move from their position north of Dog
company, "which was partly dug in, and dig in
several hundred yards to the right where they
could overlook the valley of the Kap'yong. "57 The
redeployment was executed just in time. However,
during the move a company of American tanks
from the US 72 Tank Battalion who were
supporting the 3 RAR mistook Baker company
for the Chinese and opened fire. Fortunately, only
one man was slightly wounded.
By 0900 hours, after nearly eleven hours of
intense fighting, the 3 RAR was in disarray. In
hindsight, it is clear that the odds were stacked
against 3 RAR's successful defence ofHill504.
The feature was lower, and hence much easier to
attack, than Hill 677, and during the battle
several regiments from the 6th ROK Division
conducted a disorderly withdrawal through the
Australian positions. As the Chinese stepped up

their attacks against 3 RAR's flanks, the
Australian rifle platoons were forced to withdraw
into tight groups in the centre of their respective
company areas. 58 This move precluded any
further attempts to restore the positions that had
been overrun. 59 With his companies now
completely isolated, and his communications
disrupted and command posts over-run,
Lieutenant-Colonel Ferguson, CO of 3 RAR, could
no longer control the battle nor co-ordinate the
battalion's fire support. Fearing that the 3 RAR
could not withstand another night of Chinese
attacks, Ferguson relinquished command and
instructed his company commanders- on orders
from the Brigade Commander himself - to
execute a fighting withdrawal. 60 That the 3 RAR
rifle companies were able to execute this
manoeuvre while continuing to inflict heavy losses
on the enemy testifies to the courage and
determination of the Australian soldier at
Kap'yong.
By 1100 hours 2 PPCLI's Baker company was
in position. There was little activity along the
Patricias' front during the remaining daylight
hours of 24 April, save for the occasional Chinese
reconnaissance party. 61 As darkness began to
descend, Brigadier Burke, commander of the
27th Brigade, flew over the Patricia positions in
a loudspeaker-equipped Douglas Dakota. Burke
wished the men well, and told them that they
were going to have to fight the impending battle
on their own. According to Lieutenant Brian
Munro, Burke's aerial broadcast ended with
some generic "stiff-upper-lip" words of
encouragement. 62 Not surprisingly, Brigadier
Burke's brief appearance high over the battlefield
attracted the scorn of the soldiers in the firing
line. 63 Indeed, it is highly unlikely that Burke's
fly-by did much to steel the nerves of the men on
the ground, and his well-meaning words of
encouragement probably only served to reinforce
their apprehension about the coming battle.
At 2130 hours, Baker company came under
light mortar and MMG fire; minutes later a
concentration of approximately 400 Chinese was
observed forming up for an attack below the
company's forward platoon position. 6 ~ Major
Lilley immediately called for mortar and artillery
support. However, mortar and artillery fire could
not stop the impending Chinese attack. By 2200
hours the forward platoon was under attack;
thirty minutes later, Lieutenant H. Ross, the
17
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The author in front Q[ the Baker company position. Battalion Tactical
Headquarters was locatedjust behind the ridgeline to the author's right.

platoon commander, reported that his position
was partially over-run. Fearing the platoon would
be completely over-run and cut off, Major Lilley
ordered Ross and his men to fix bayonets and
fall back into the main company position.

under the fire of a heavy concentration of tracer
bullets can appreciate the terror induced by that
kind and volume of fire. With the crack of the
machine guns, and the 81 mm mortars firing at
their shortest range, the enemy never hada
chance. 67

Most of Lieutenant Ross' platoon reached the
main company defence perimeter unscathed.
Others were not so lucky. A Patricia from Baker
company recounted:

Indeed, when the Able company rear platoon
began firing what Stone considered to be
unnecessarily long bursts of light machine-gun
(LMG) fire in support of Bn Tac HQ, the CO
radioed the company second-in-command and
rejoined, "stop your firing, you bloody fool! We
can take care of ourselves. Save your
ammunition; you're going to need it!" 6 e Having
successfully staved off the attack against Bn Tac
HQ, the Mortar Platoon's .50 calibre heavy
machine-guns were turned on a large body of
Chinese troops fording the Kap'yong River.
Silhouetted by the bright moonlight. the Chinese
were mowed down in swaths by the powerful guns
at a range of approximately 800 metres. 69
Seventy-one Chinese dead were counted on the
banks of the Kap'yong River the next morning. 70

[Lieutenant] Ross gave us the order to move
out. Just as we jumped up Ross added that
anyone with ammo left should cover the retreat
of the wounded. I had three shells left so I
dropped back down and fired them off. Just as
I jumped up again I fell over a Chinaman who
was running up the side of the hill. He let fly
and got me in the neck then ran into the end of
my bayonet.r'"

While a fierce fire fight raged between Baker
company and the attacking Chinese, a body of
enemy troops attempted to infiltrate the battalion
area behind Lieutenant-Colonel Stone's Tac HQ. 66
The Mortar platoon's .30 and .50 calibre
Browning machine-guns were promptly called
into action to meet the threat. Stone recollected:
Ammunition belts for [the .30 and .50 calibre
Browning machine-guns] were loaded with one
tracer bullet to four ball, or ordinary bullets.
Fire was held until the Chinese had broken
through the trees about two hundred meters
away. Twenty-four machine guns cut loose
together. Only those who have experienced being

At this point, it is instructive to outline the
assault tactics the Chinese employed against 2
PPCLI at Kap'yong. Save for a light preliminary
mortar bombardment and MMG fire, the Chinese
attacks against Hill 677 were executed without
fire support. Consequently, the Chinese were
forced to move as close to the Canadian positions
as possible, using the cover of darkness to
maximum advantage, where they waited for the
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signal to initiate the attack. Lacking battlefield
wireless communications, the Chinese assault
troops were directed against their objectives with
bugles and tracer rounds. Armed with "burp"
guns and concussion grenades, the Chinese
attempted to overrun the Canadian positions
quickly by sheer weight of numbers, and working
around the flanks.
At 0030 hours on 25 April, Dog company
reported enemy movement to the west and north
of 10 platoon, the company's westernmost
platoon. 71 Several probing attacks were launched
against 10 platoon, but they were driven off by
MMG, mortar and artillery fire. An hour later, a
cacophony of Chinese bugles was heard and the
scarlet rods of tracer bullets lit up the sky,
signalling the start of an all-out Chinese attack
against Lieutenant M.G. Levy's 10 platoon.
By 0230 hours, "every weapon in the
battalion was firing" on the estimated 200
Chinese converging on 10 platoon from three
sides. 72 According to the Canadian official history,
the attack on 10 platoon was carried out with
such speed and momentum that the Chinese were
able to over-run the MMG section from 12 platoon
supporting 10 platoon.T1 Oral sources, however,
cast doubt on at least part ofthis interpretation.
A veteran of 11 platoon recently reported that
his section was firing in the vicinity of the No. 1
gun during the attack, and that its crew may have
been hit by "friendly" Bren gun fire. 74 In any event,
the two Patricias manning the No. 1 gun were
killed at their post, and both MMGs were
temporarily lost to the enemy.
Unable to overrun the 10 platoon positions,
the enemy pressed his attack against 12 platoon,
situated in a saddle between 10 and 11
platoons. 75 At this time, the 16 NZFR was
engaging a DF task in front of the Dog company
positions "continuously at the slow rate of fire
(two rounds per gun per minute) instead of
simply firing a designated number ofrounds." 76
As the Australian official historian observed, at
this rate of fire, "twenty-four rounds exploded
every thirty seconds in a target area some 150200 metres across." 77 With the New Zealanders
running low on 25 pounder ammunition, the
Patricias' supporting fire was soon reduced to
the "very slow" rate (one round per gun per
minute). The Chinese, however, continued to
press their attack against 12 platoon, forcing the

Patricias to request a return to the "slow" rate of
fire. 78
Despite the sterling service rendered by the
gunners, 10 platoon was cut-off; 12 platoon was
overrun, and forced to withdraw to Dog company
HQ. In view of the increasingly grave situation,
the acting commander of Dog company, Captain
Wally Mills, called for artillery fire on his own
position. 79 After assuring the CO that his men
were well dug in below ground level, Mills was
granted his request. For approximately twenty
minutes, artillery pounded the Dog company
positions. The shrapnel shells, packed with steel
balls, were fused to burst several metres above
the ground. The fire had the desired effect,
sending thousands of steel balls and white-hot
shell fragments whistling through the inky
blackness, decimating the Chinese ranks. Having
driven the attackers from the Dog company
locality, the gunners turned their attention to the
approaches leading to the company positions.
Forty minutes had passed since the first
shrapnel shells rained down on the Dog company
positions. In total, the action required "some
2300 rounds" from the 16 NZFR's 25 pounder
field guns, Ro "and many thousands of Canadian
mortar and small arms rounds." 81 The Chinese,
however, continued to attempt an infiltration of
the battalion area through Dog company for the
rest of the night. Each time they were driven back
by artillery and mortar fire.s 2 By first light, the
Chinese had withdrawn, and 12 platoon
reclaimed its former position. At this time, the
two Vickers MMGs that had been lost hours
earlier were successfully recovered. Interestingly,
the Chinese had made no attempt to disable or
use the No. 1 gun. Not only was it undamaged,
but over 100 unexpended rounds remained in
the belt, 83 suggesting that the Patricia gunners
were indeed hit by "friendly fire." Meanwhile,
Baker company reoccupied its forward platoon
position.
While the men of Dog company were fighting
for their lives on the battalion's left flank, the
Chinese infiltrated the Kap'yong River valley,
severing the supply route leading to Hill677. Cut
off from the rest of the 27th Brigade, and running
dangerously low on mortar and small arms
ammunition, medical supplies, food and water,
Lieutenant-Colonel Stone requested an airdrop
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Road leading to the northeastjace of Hill 677. Able and Charlie companies were
located here. The position held by Day company was on the highground to the right.

of critical supplies at 0430 hours. Six hours later,
four C-119 "flying boxcars" from an USAF base
in Japan appeared over the battlefield. The drop
was an unqualified success, with only four
parachutes missing their targets. 84 The Patricia
rifle companies immediately sent parties out to
collect the supplies and prepared for the enemy
attack expected that night. At the same time, a
number of seriously wounded Patricias were
medevaced by two US Army helicopters. 85
Fortunately for the exhausted Canadians, no
further enemy attacks materialized on 25 April.
The Chinese continued to harass 10 platoon with
automatic weapons fire for another twenty-four
hours, but "for the rest of the offensive the enemy
sought elsewhere for tactical gains." 86 By 1400
hours, the road at the base of Hill 677 was
reported open and clear of the enemy, and Stone
requested that additional supplies and
reinforcements be brought forward by vehicle.
At this time, the remaining Patricia dead and
wounded were evacuated.

*****
~e

Battle of Kap'yong cost the Patricias 10
killed and 23 wounded - a mercifully low
number of casualties given the intensity of the
engagementY Not included in the official
Canadian casualty return were an untold number
of soldiers who, although not visibly wounded,

J.

suffered the equally debilitating symptoms of
post-traumatic stress. A Patricia recounted:
[After the air drop] we were issued with two
rations per man. [Corporal] Bishop sat down
on the edge of his trench and ate two C rations.

There were three meals in each one. Then he
went around seeing if anyone had any old ham
and lima beans they didn't need-""

Bishop's voracious appetite was, in part,
symptomatic of post-traumatic stress. 89 For
most, the physiological effects of post-traumatic
stress disappeared shortly after the battle. Some,
however, are haunted by the images of Kap'yong
to this day. Others have subconsciously blocked
out the horrific events of 23 to 26 April, and have
little, or no memory of their role in the battle.
Indeed, one Patricia from Support Company who
participated in the defence of Bn Tac HQ has no
recollection, save for the air drop, of his two days
and nights on Hill677. 90
On 26 April, 2 PPCLI turned its positions on
Hill 677 over to elements of the American 1st
Cavalry Division. During the relief, LieutenantColonel Stone was given command of the rear
guard force, aptly known as the "Stone force,"
that covered the withdrawal of the rest of the 28th
Brigade (the 27th Brigade became the 28th
Brigade on 25 April). 91 The withdrawal was
executed without incident, and on 28 April the
entire 28th Brigade, including 2 PPCLI, moved
into a reserve area thirty miles east of Seoul.
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So concluded the Battle of Kap'yong. In
recognition of the battalion's part in stemming
the Chinese offensive in central Korea, the 2
PPCLI, along with the 3 RAR and the American
Tank Company, was awarded the US Presidential
citation. Without a doubt, the Canadians had
earned their citation. The 2 PPCLI had held its
ground against a numerically superior Chinese
force, and then conducted an orderly
withdrawal. 02 As Stone pointed out, "we were
surrounded by the enemy. We could have run,
panicked or surrendered. We stayed, fought and
withdrew on orders in a soldierly fashion. This,
in itself, was unique in Korea where bug-outs
were the accepted manner ofwithdrawing." 93
In hindsight, Kap'yong was probably the limit
of the Chinese offensive in the area. Had their
objective been further to the south, there can be
no question that the 2 PPCLI would have been
wiped out. This does not change the fact that the
fight for Hill677 was "a good battle, well planned
and well fought. "SH The Pairicias performed
magnificently, and their successful retention of
the height made an important contribution to the
Commonwealth victory at Kap'yong. When
compared to subsequent Canadian battlefield
performance in Korea, the 2 PPCLI's achievement
at Kap'yong is even more remarkable. The
question, however, remains: What made the
Patricias' stand possible?
There were five primary ingredients in the
recipe for victory on Hill 677. The first, and most
important, was the tremendous amount of
supporting fire available to the 2 PPCLI. It is
estimated that the New Zealanders alone fired
approximately 10,000 rounds in support ofthe
Canadians during the night of 24-25 April. 95 The
exact number of rounds fired by the Americans,
on the other hand, is less certain. Ian McGibbon
claimed that A Company of the 2 American
Chemical Mortar Battalion "fired 1960 [ 120mm]
rounds in support of the Canadians during the
night. "s16 Lieutenant-Colonel Stone, however, was
adamant that "when the battle got hot on the
Australian front the FOO from the US mortars
on my front walked out and never a pop did we
get from his company." 97 In any event, the
supporting fire available to the Patricia rifle
companies was not confined to New Zealand and
American sources. The Canadians also relied
heavily on their own Support Company, which
fired an untold number of 81 mm and 60 mm

mortar rounds, and thousands of .50, .303., and
.30 calibre machine-gun rounds dming the night.
By covering the gaps between the company
"islands" of defence and the ridge line approaches
to Hill677 with accurate, pre-registered artillery,
mortar and MMG OF tasks, the Patricia rifle
companies were able to call in a tremendous
amount of fire power on a relatively small area
as the tactical situation dictated.
Despite the pre-eminent role of supporting
fire on Hill 677, there were other factors that
ultimately helped to make the Canadian stand
possible. One was the Second World War
experiences of the 2 PPCLI's senior officers. By
carrying out a thorough daylight reconnaissance
of Hill 677, Stone and his subordinate officers
were able to detect where the Chinese attacks
would most likely be directed, and deploy the
battalion and allocate supporting arms
accordingly. Similarly, Lieutenant-Colonel Stone's
redeployment of Baker company to cover the vital
ground on the battalion's right flank probably
saved the Patricias from disaster. Had Baker
company not been redeployed, it is likely that
Bn Tac HQ, the Mortar platoon and the Pioneer
platoon would have been overrun by the first
Chinese attack. This would have denied the rifle
companies the support of the 81 mm mortars,
and severed 2 PPCLI's communications "with the
balance of the brigade. "98 The ability to identify
ground that is vital to the defence of a position is
a skill that can cnly be acquired through
operational experie:1ce- experience that Stone
and many of his of.'icers acquired during two
years of fighting witl the 1st Canadian Division
in the mountains of~ >icily and Italy. 99
Also contributing to 2 PPCLI's success was
the incorporation of the tactical lessons learned
by the 29th Brigade into its training program at
Miryang. As already noted, the battalion arrived
in Korea an independent, yet untrained, unit.
With "no rear headquarters closer than Seattle,"
Stone was able to conduct the collective training
of his battalion as he saw fit. 100 This was a luxury
enjoyed by no other Canadian battalion
commander in Korea. By emphasising the tactical
concepts of company "islands" and all round
defence in Korea's mountainous terrain, Stone
prepared his battalion for precisely the type of
engagement it fought on Hill677. Moreover, the
CO's emphasis on occupying night-time defensive
positions under simulated battlefield conditions
21
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at Miryang helped inoculate the Patricias against
the fear and panic of being surrounded.
Given the above, it is not surprising that 2
PPCLI's morale remained high throughout the
fight for Hill677. Despite the apprehension and
jockeying for position that characterized the final
hours before the Chinese attack, the soldiers of
2 PPCLI held their ground and "kept their
weapons firing." 101 Throughout their terrible
ordeal the soldiers in the line of fire retained their
faith in their officers and NCOs, their training,
and their equipment. As Lieutenant-Colonel
Stone reminisced, "Kap'yong demonstrated that
morale, spirit of the troops, or call it what you
will, is probably the most important factor in
battle, and all the logistical support, the finest
plan and the many other factors that are
considered as requirements to fight a battle, are
subsidiary to it." 102 Further buttressing the mens'
morale was the knowledge that if seriously
wounded, they were only minutes away from
advanced medical treatment. 103 The medevac
helicopter was still in its infancy at Kap'yong, but
its positive impact on morale (not to mention the
number of fatal casualties) was already apparent.
Finally, the failure of the enemy to co-ordinate
and press his attacks must not be overlooked.
By telegraphing where they were going to attack
with bugles and tracer bullets, the Patricia
company and platoon commanders had plenty
of time to call in DF tasks. 104 In their tight assault
formations, the attacking Chinese troops were
literally pulverized when defensive fire was
brought to bear. Additionally, the enemy's own
lack of supporting arms ensured that Patricia
defensive positions were still intact when the
enemy crossed his start line for the attack. In
light of these serious tactical shortcomings, one
can only respect the fortitude and courage of the
Chinese soldiers who did battle with the
Canadians on that anonymous Korean height
known as Hill677.
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using automatic pistols ( .45 cal
Ml911A1s) and the cadillac ofStens
(9 mm Mk.V); where as the line
infantry were being issued revolvers
(.38 Smith and Wesson, Enfields) and
9 mm Mk.ll and Mk.III Stens.
Looking at only elite formations,
which was pretty much the case
concerning the German units who
fought at Amhem and the uniforms
that Mr. Anderson looked at, can give
you a slanted opinion of what the
other guy is using; you have to look
at the whole picture.
As an Airborne soldier, Mr.
Anderson talks about the Denison
Smock and he states, "Our normal
"Dennison" Smock was an excellent
cover for parachuting, it had 10
pockets to carry gear, including a
sleeve for ampules of morphine and
first aid. The smock was made of
heavy denim, un-lined, camouflage
and ideal for fighting in moderate
weather, but totally inadequate in

91. The "Stone Force" consisted of 2 PPCLI and the
remnants of 3 RAR.
92. Intelligence officers at 8th Army HQ later estimated that
the 27th Brigade had held off an entire Chinese division
during the fighting at Kap'yong. See "2 PPCLI Action
Kap'yong Area," DHH, File 145.2P70 13(05). pp.26-27.
93. Stone and Castonguay. Two Canadian Batiles, p.78.
94. "Kapyong- A Speech by Colonel J.R. Stone," p.189.
95. O'Neill, Australia in the Korean Ww; 1950-1953,
Volume II: Combat Operations, p.159.
96. McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume
II, Combat Operations, p.439. fn 98.
97. "Kapyong- A Speech by Colonel J.R. Stone." p.188.
98. "2 PPCLI Action Kap'yong Area." DHH, File
145.2P7013(D5), p.40.
99. Stone, interview. 8 November 1994.
100.Stone, interview, 8 November 1994.
10J.Stone, interview, 8 November 1994.
102. "Kapyong- A Speech by Colonel J.R. Stone," p.185.
103.Stone, interview, 8 November 1994; Major Rod
Middleton (retired). interview, Calgary. Alberta. 17
October 1994.
104.Major Vince Lilley, quoted in Wood, Strange
Battleground, p. 79.

Brent Watson is finishing up a DND PostDoctoral Fellowship at the Centre for Military
and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary.
He is currently completing a manuscript on
the Canadians in Korea. His next research
project will be a social study of Canadian
soldiers in the Congo serving with UNEF 1.

winter." Let us sort things out
correctly. The Denison
Smock was produced with four
exterior pockets that closed by snap
fasteners, and there was no sleeve for
ampules of morphine and first aid,
these features were added by the
users. It was only designed for
fighting in the moderate European
weather not the winter; the Allies
employed the layering principal for
fighting in the winter so other items
of clothing were suppose to be worn
under and over the Denison Smock
in winter.
The Allies tried to rationalize their
uniform production by attempting to
produce uniforms that could be used
for a wide range of applications thus
saving materials, manpower and
shipping space when supplying their
armies overseas. The woolen
battledress uniform was to be the
standard building block of the
Canadian and British uniforms and
both over and under this could be
added specific items when needed
such as long underwear, string vests,

sweaters, white camouflage smocks
and this is known as the layer
principal. The Germans wasted their
resources producing over a dozen
patterns of camoullage for three
different arms of service as well as
numerous specialty items as new
units were formed. This stuff is all
"trendy" even by today's standards,
but it is certainly not proof of superior
workmanship. Battledress (BD) was
a very popular design in the 1940s
and German U-Boat crews used
British BD from captured BEF stocks
on their boats and the German Army
even copied the design calling it their
M44 Uniform. By the way, Canadian
industry has the reputation of having
produced the best quality BD during
WWII.

The Allies did have a problem
getting the appropriate uniforms to
the right place on time and getting
winter uniforms to the front in 1944
was problem. Mind you this was a
problem that the Germans had been
wrestling with on the Eastern Front
continued on p.88
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